THE PRIATE SFCLIm

LITIGATION REFORM ACT:

THE SCIENTER DEBACLE

INTRODUCTION

Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (§
10(b)),' and Rule lOb-52 promulgated thereunder, regulates and
limits misrepresentations, "' omissions,4 and insider trading in
securities. Before the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) , complaints alleging securities fraud
were required to meet Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in order to survive a motion to dismiss.' The heightened
pleading requirements for averments of fraud or mistake under Rule
9(b) were designed to prevent vexatious litigation at an early stage. 8
The dangers of vexatious litigation in the securities fraud context vary

I Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (§ 10(b))
makes it
illegal for any person "[tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Securities and Exchange Commission may
prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1999).
2 The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) promulgated rule 10b-5
under § 10(b). Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1997).
s"Omission" is defined as "an assertion that does not accord with the facts."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1016 (7th ed. 1999).
"Misrepresentation" is defined as "the act of leaving something out." BLACK'S
LAW DICrnONARY 1116 (7th ed. 1999).
5 See JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS 837 (1995) (defining insider trading
as
"trading while in possession of material nonpublic information"). Under §10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC, a corporate insider who possesses
material nonpublic information must abstain from trading or disclosing the
information. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198 n.10 (1st Cir.
1999).
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(1999).
7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The rule states: "In all averments
of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally." I&
8 See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999).
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from those in other areas of litigation. 9 As the United States Supreme
Court noted in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, frivolous
securities fraud claims delay the normal business operations of a
corporate defendant while the plaintiffs conduct extensive discovery
to find relevant evidence.'0
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder," the Supreme Court held that a
private plaintiff who seeks damages under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
must allege that the defendant acted with scienter, an "intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.' ' 2 An allegation of negligence was
deemed to be insufficient to state a claim for securities fraud. 13 The
Supreme Court, however, did not answer the question of whether
pleading recklessness under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 is sufficient to
4
satisfy the scienter requirement.
Since Ernst, all federal circuit courts have accepted some form of
recklessness as sufficient to satisfy scienter in private securities fraud
cases.15 With respect to substantive pleading requirements of scienter
under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the Second Circuit adopted the most
rigorous test. '6 The Second Circuit demanded that a plaintiff allege
facts showing a defendant's "motive and opportunity" to commit
fraud' 7 or strong circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless
behavior.'
Implicit in this standard is a distinction between the
procedural and substantive requirements of scienter. Procedurally, a
plaintiff must "allege" facts to endure a motion to dismiss.
Substantively, the plaintiff must prove those facts to succeed in a
securities fraud case. Although every circuit court agreed that some
9 See id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 739-44
(1975)).
10 See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 739-44.
11 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
12 Id. at 193.
13 Seeid. at210.
14 See id. at 193 n.12. In retaining recklessness as a possible
means of satisfying
the scienter requirement, the Supreme Court stated that recklessness "is considered
to be a form of intentional conduct" in some areas of the law. Id.
15See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted). Recklessness also has been accepted as a sufficient basis to satisfy "intent to
defraud in criminal prosecutions under § 17(a)(1) of the Exchange Act and under
the mail and wire fraud statutes." Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198
(1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
'6 SeeShields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
P See id. at 1130 ("Motive would entail concrete
benefits that could be realized by

one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged.
Opportunity would entail the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete
benefits by the means alleged.").
18 See id. at 1128.
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form of recklessness is a sufficient substantive basis for scienter, the
circuit courts differed on the procedural pleading requirements
necessary for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss. 9 Most notably,
the Second and Ninth Circuits reached disparate interpretations of
the procedural requirements of Rule 9(b) .2 While the Second
Circuit required a plaintiff to allege specific facts that demonstrate a
"strong inference" that the defendant acted with the required
scienter,' the Ninth Circuit did not require a plaintiff to allege any
specific facts to survive a motion to dismiss. 22 These inconsistent
applications of the specificity requirement under Rule 9(b) allowed
questionable securities actions to continue, prompting congressional
intervention. 21

In 1995, Congress determined that Rule 9(b) had "not
24
prevented abuse of the securities laws by private litigants."
Repeating the concerns about frivolous litigation that the Supreme
Court raised in Blue Chip,25 Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act. 26 The PSLRA was intended to prevent
frivolous securities fraud suits21 through stringent pleading
requirements. 28 Section 78u-4(b) (2) of the PSLRA requires a plaintiff

to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
See Biyant, 187 F.3d at 1282.
See, e.g.,
In reGlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994); In re
Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993).
21 See Time Warner,9 F.3d at 268; Connecticut Nat'l Bank
v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d
957, 962 (2d Cir. 1987).
See GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1545 (permitting scienter to be averred generally).
23 The Second Circuit admitted that it had allowed actions
involving "fairly
tenuous inferences" of scienter to endure summary judgment. See Press v. Chemical
Inv. SerF. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
Iq

20

24

H.R. CONE. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,

740.

See S. REp. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683
(stating that securities fraud litigation "unnecessarily increase[s] the cost of raising
capital and chill[s] corporate disclosure, [and is] often based on nothing more than
a company's announcement of bad news, not evidence of fraud").
7
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 8u-4 (1999).
27 Frivolous actions recognized by Congress include: (1)
the filing of lawsuits
against security issuers in response to material changes in stock price, irrespective of
the issuer's culpability; (2) targeting defendants with "deep pockets;" (3) using
discovery processes to coerce settlement; and (4) client manipulation by class action
attorneys.
See H.R. CONE. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730. Congress and courts were particularly weary of "strike suits."
A "strike suit" is a "suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid claim,
brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated
settlement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999).
See H.R. CONE. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
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the defendant acted with the required state of mind."'
This
language of the PSLRA reflects the scienter requirement" that the
Supreme Court developed in Ernst and that is found in subsequent
circuit court decisions.
A complaint that fails to meet this
requirement will be dismissed.5
The language of the scienter requirement under the PSLRA has
led to a debate over intent of Congress. Courts are divided on
whether, under § 78u4(b) (2) of the PSLRA, (1) particularized
allegations of recklessness are included in the "required state of
mind" as satisfying the substantive requirement of scienter, and (2)
allegations of "motive and opportunity" alone raise a "strong
inference" of the "required state of mind." In other words, does the
PSLRA codify the Second Circuit's substantive and procedural
pleading requirements or did Congress use the "strong inference"
language from the Second Circuit without codifying its pleading
standard?
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (1999).
50 "Scienter" is defined generally as "[a] mental state consisting of an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In this sense, the term is used most often in the
context of securities fraud." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1347 (7th ed. 1999). As
developed by the courts, an actionable securities fraud claim under § l0b and rule
10b-5 requires a private plaintiff to plead (1) that the defendant made a
misrepresentation or omission of (2) a material (3) fact (4) with scienter (5) which
the plaintiff reasonably relied on and which (6) proximately caused (7) damages. See
Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1281 (citation omitted). The requirements for a securities fraud
action were also restated in the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), (2) (1999). To
state a securities fraud action, the plaintiff must allege:
(1) Misleading statements and omissions
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant (A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which
they were made, not misleading; the complaint shall specify
each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information
and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on
which that belief is formed.
(2) Required state of mind
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.
, See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (A) (1999).
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This Comment analyzes the various interpretations of the
PSLRA's scienter standard. Section I(A) briefly reviews the scienter
standards that the district courts have applied under the PSLRA.
Section I(B) introduces several recent circuit court opinions that
interpret the scienter standard under the PSLRA. Section II presents
a discussion and analysis of the text of the PSLRA, based on the
circuit courts' opinions introduced in section I. Using the circuit
courts' opinions discussed in sections I and II, section III evaluates
the legislative history of the PSLRA. Section IV summarizes the
current state of the law regarding scienter under the PSLRA. Finally,
this Comment concludes that Congress intended to create a more
stringent procedural requirement than the Second Circuit's "motive
and opportunity" test, without altering the substantive requirement of
recklessness.
I. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT UNDER THE

PSLRA
A. District Court Interpretations
After the enactment of the PSLRA, district courts' considerations
of the PSLRA's effects on pleading scienter yielded disparate
standards.32 The varying scienter standards can be placed into three
categories:33 (1) standards that allow plaintiffs to plead motive and
opportunity or, alternatively, an inference of recklessness; s4 (2)
standards that accept an inference of recklessness as sufficient to
allege scienter, but reject the lesser standard of motive and
opportunity;5 and (3) standards that require an inference of the
defendant's conscious intent to defraud.36 The divergence created in
the district courts based on these three scienter standards set the

2

See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).

For a thorough discussion of scienter under the PSLRA in the district courts, see
generally Michael B. Dunn, Note, PleadingScienter After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: Or, A Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193 (1998); see also Richard
H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments Affecting
the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1003, 1025 n.124 (1998)

(listing federal district court cases discussing the various scienter standards).
IMSee Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974 ("Of the district courts considering the
issue, roughly sixty percent (some twenty cases) have followed the Second Circuit,
while the others have interpreted the PSLRA as adopting some higher standard.").
See, e.g., Epstein v. Itron Inc., 993 F. Supp. 1314, 1325 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
See, e.g., Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F.
Supp.2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo. 1998).
See, e.g., Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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foundation for the circuit courts to determine de novo the true
standard of scienter under the PSLRA.
B. Circuit CourtInterpretations
To date, eight circuit courts have addressed the scienter issue.
While two of these circuit courts discussed the effects of the PSLRA
on scienter only in dicta,17 the other six circuit courts' holdings
interpreted such effects.'
Of the six circuit courts' holdings
addressing scienter, three courts analyzed both the plain meaning
and legislative history of the PSLRA to determine congressional
intent, 39 one court interpreted the PSLRA without analysis, 40 and two
courts considered only the plain meaning of the PSLRA.4 ' Amidst
this conflict of interpretations among the circuit courts, the same
three scienter standards developed by the district courts have
reemerged in the circuit opinions.
1. Circuit Court Opinions Discussing Scienter in Dicta
In Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc., the Fifth Circuit was the
first federal appellate court to mention the PSLRA in conjunction
with the Second Circuit's holding on pleading requirements.
See, e.g., Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620-21 (4th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the PSLRA in dicta with an analysis of its text and legislative history);
Williams v. WMX Tech., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1999) (commenting on the
PSLRA's effect on scienter in dicta without analyzing either the text or the legislative
history of the PSLRA).
38 See generally Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999);
Bryant
v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970;
); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Advanta Corp.
Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); Press v. Chemical Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d
529 (2d Cir. 1999).
.39See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 193-95; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977-79; Advanta, 180
F.3d at 531-33. In examining the PSLRA, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits
determined that the text of the PSLRA is ambiguous. See Greebel 194 F.3d at 192;
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977. The First and Third
Circuits also regarded the legislative history of the PSLRA as only marginally valuable
in revealing Congress's intended result for scienter. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192;
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the
legislative background to interpret the statute's meaning. See Silicon Graphics, 183
F.3d at 977.
40 See Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38.
41 See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283-86; Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549-51.
42 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997).
Williams involved a class action suit alleging
37

securities fraud under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and fraud and negligent misrepresentations
under state law between January 1, 1987 and December 31, 1993. See id. at 176. The
amended complaint named WMX Technologies, Inc. (WMX), a waste disposal
corporation, its President, Dean Buntrock, and EIA, a trade group representing the
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Although the PSLRA was irrelevant to the holding of the case, 3 the
court included its interpretation of the PSLRA in dicta. Without
analysis, the Fifth Circuit stated that the PSLRA codified the Second
Circuit's standard of pleading with particularity in security fraud
44
cases.
interests of waste disposal companies, as defendants. See id. With respect to the
securities fraud claim, the amended complaint alleged that the defendants
perpetuated a myth of a garbage crisis through misrepresentations in the press,
WMX's face-to-face negotiations to buy plaintiffs business, and in WMX's January
1992 prospectus.
See id. at 176-78.
Plaintiffs further alleged that the
misrepresentations caused, among other things, plaintiffs to exchange their
company, Texas Sanitation Industries, for stock in WMX. See id.
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the
defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was denied under Rules 9(b) and 12(b) (6). See
id. at 177. The district court, however, certified the ruling for interlocutory appeal.
See id
43 The PSLRA was irrelevant to the holding of Williams because
Williams was filed
before the effective date of the statute. See id at 178.
See id. at 177-78. The Fifth Circuit stated:
As the Second Circuit has noted, articulating the elements of fraud
with particularity requires a plaintiff to specify the statements
contended to be fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where
the statements were made, and explain why the statements were
fraudulent. We agree with the Second Circuit's approach. This suit
was filed prior to the effective date of the Private Securities Litigation
(PSLRA), and while its provisions do not apply, the Act adopted the
same standard we apply today.
Id. (citations omitted).
This language implicitly adopts the Second Circuit's pleading standard under
the PSLRA, which includes the Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity" or
recklessness test, in addition to the interpretive case law of such quoted above. It
should be noted, however, that Williams does not expressly state that the PSLRA
codifies the Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity" or recklessness standard
regarding scienter. The Williams case established particularity requirements under
Rule 9(b), and did not interpret scienter requirements under the PSLRA. This
allows the Fifth Circuit to distinguish Williams in any future cases in which the court
addresses the scienter debacle: First, the court may dismiss the language in Williams
addressing the PSLRA as dicta. Second, the court can hold that Williams did not, in
fact, imply a codification of the "motive and opportunity" or recklessness standard,
but merely some minimum allegations that are necessary, but not sufficient, to meet
the pleading requirement under the PSLRA.
Furthermore, after reviewing the allegations presented, the court held that the
amended complaint did not allege fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b). See id at
180. Thus, the court reversed and remanded the district court's denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss with directions to dismiss the complaint. See id
Specifically, the court found that the allegations that the plaintiffs sold their
company based on a false conception of a crisis regarding the increasing scarcity of
landfills was not stated with particularity, because the complaint did not state the
contents of the misrepresentations or the place or time in which they were made. See
id. at 179-80. Moreover, the court observed that the allegations of misrepresentations
within WMX's prospectus were not pleaded with particularity because the exact
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The Fourth Circuit, in Phillips v. LCI International,Inc.,45 went
beyond the Fifth Circuit's mention of the PSLRA's pleading
requirements and briefly discussed the PSLRA's effect on scienter.46
The Fourth Circuit had no need to rule on the PSLRA's exact impact
on scienter because the court held that the plaintiff in Phillipsdid not
meet the most lenient scienter standard possible under the PSLRA.47
misrepresentations in the prospectus were not noted. See id. at 180. In addition, the
court noted that the reason that the alleged misrepresentations within WMX's
prospectus were false was also not noted in the amended complaint. See id.
Similarly, the court proffered that the allegations of misrepresentations in the press
were not specific because the complaint did not state which statements in the named
articles were false and why they were false. See id. 179-80.
45 190 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 1999). Phillips involved a securities
fraud class action
premised upon allegations of material misrepresentations regarding merger
negotiations of a long distance telecommunications company in violation of § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 613. Specifically, plaintiffs, shareholders of
LCI International, Inc. (LCI) who sold LCI stock between February 17, 1998, and
March 9, 1998, alleged that defendants, LCI and its Chairman of the Board and
CEO, Brian Thompson, made material misrepresentations. See id at 613. The
alleged misrepresentations consisted of Thompson's February 17, 1998 statements
stating that LCI is "not a company that's for sale" and that LCI "was more of a buyer
than a seller" when LCI was engaged in merger negotiations. Id. at 612 (quotations
omitted). Plaintiffs alleged that Thompson's material misstatements caused plaintiffs
to sell their stock at artificially deflated prices between February 17, 1998, the date of
Thompson's statements, and March 9, 1998, the date on which the merger was
publicly announced. See id. at 613. In support of scienter, the plaintiffs noted
statements made by defendant admitting that merger negotiations were in progress
for three to four weeks prior to the public announcement of the merger. See id.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed
the action. See id The district court found that the alleged statements were not false
or material. See id at 613-14.
46 See id.
at 620-21.
47 See id. at 621. The court, however, briefly discussed
the text and legislative
history of the statute within a survey of previous circuit court decisions. See id. at 62021 (citing to the opinions of the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit interpreting the
PSLRA). The court stated that "the PSLRA did not change the standard of proof a
plaintiff must meet or the kind of evidence a plaintiff must adduce to demonstrate
scienter at trial in a securities fraud case." Id. at 620 (citing In re Comshare, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999). The court further remarked that the
PSLRA, however, "does seek to heighten the standard for pleading scienter, and so
'chang[es] what a plaintiff must plead in his complaint in order to survive a motion
to dismiss.'" Id. (quoting Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549). Although the court discussed
the PSLRA, it declined to determine for itself how the PSLRA affects pleading
scienter.
In affirming the district court's dismissal, the court determined that the alleged
misrepresentations did not amount to material misstatements of fact. See id. at 615.
The court also found that plaintiffs failed adequately to plead scienter under the
most lenient possible interpretation of the PSLRA, which would codify the Second
Circuit's "motive and opportunity" or recklessness standard. See id. at 620. Because
the plaintiff did not meet the most lenient interpretation of the PSLRA's effect on
scienter, the court declined to rule on the exact standard of scienter under the
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2. Circuit Court Holdings Discussing Scienter
In Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., the Second Circuit
addressed the PSLRA's effects on scienter.48 In this securities fraud
class action,49 the Second Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit, did not
PSLRA. See i&t at 621. The court held that in order for allegations of scienter to
amount to a "strong inference" under the PSLRA, they must have a substantial
factual basis. See id. (quotation omitted). The court further held that the allegations
in Phillipsdid not amount to a "strong inference" of reckless or conscious conduct on
behalf of the defendants because the alleged misstatements were not adequately
alleged to be materially false. See id. The court defined "recklessness" as "an act 'so
highly unreasonable and such an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary
care as to present a danger of misleading the plaintiff to the extent that the danger
was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been
aware of it.'" Id. (quotations omitted). The court also held that motive was not
properly alleged because the complaint misstated LCI's Board of Director's vote on
the merger, because the alleged motive to deflate the value of LCI's stock was at odds
with Thompson's initial vote on the merger, because the alleged motive to maintain
an executive position did not constitute a "strong inference" of scienter, and because
the alleged motive to inflate the stock price was not in conjunction with allegations
of insider trading. See id. at 622-23. The court, however, did concede that
opportunity was present. See id at 621. This result was found by the court to be in
accordance with the purpose of the PSLRA to curtail frivolous securities litigation
through heightened pleading requirements. See id&at 623.
48
166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
49 Section 78u-4(a)(1) of the PSLRA limits the applicability of
§ 78u-4 to private
class actions brought under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4 (a) (1) (1999). In Press v. ChemicalInvestment Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir.
1999), plaintiff Donald Press, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
alleged in part that the defendants, Chemical Investment Services Corporation and
other registered broker-dealers, committed securities fraud in violation of §10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. See Press, 166 F.3d at 532-33. The alleged securities fraud resulted
from the purchase of treasury bills from the defendants. See id&at 532. Specifically,
plaintiff alleged that the broker-dealers failed to disclose a markup from the
purchase of treasury bills and also failed to disclose that funds, upon the maturity of
the treasury bills, would not be immediately available. See id, at 533. Since the delay
in availability of funds resulted in a longer period during which the treasury bills'
yield should have been computed, the yield advertised was allegedly false. See id
The defendants also allegedly designed the transaction with a delay to increase the
time during which they had use of plaintiff's funds. See id Furthermore, the
undisclosed markup was alleged to be excessive, resulting in a duty to disclose it
under federal securities laws. See id
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See id The district court
held that the markup was not excessive as a matter of law, so no duty to disclose
resulted. See id at 533. The court also held that even if the markup was excessive,
the defendants did not have a duty to disclose the markup because the defendants
were not fiduciaries of the plaintiff. See id Furthermore, the district court held that
the delay in the availability of funds at maturity was not material as a matter of law.
See id The district court also found that the plaintiff did not adequately plead that
the delay of availability of funds at maturity was a material factor in purchasing the
securities, that the fraud was "in connection with" a sale of securities as required
under § 10(b), and that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter under Rule
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analyze the PSLRA's plain meaning, nor did the court review the
legislative history. 50 Repeating the definition of scienter espoused in
Ernst and Second Circuit case law,5' the court stated that the PSLRA
codifies the pleading requirement of the Second Circuit. 52 Thus, the

court held that to allege
either (a) allege facts to
opportunity to commit
strong circumstantial

scienter under the PSLRA, "a plaintiff must
show that 'defendants had both motive and
fraud' or (b) allege facts that 'constitute
evidence of conscious misbehavior or

recklessness."'5 3

After the Second and Fifth Circuit's conclusory opinions
regarding the PSLRA, several circuits engaged in in-depth analyses of
the scienter requirement, including critiques of the plain meaning
and the legislative history of the PSLRA.
The Third Circuit
determined the PSLRA's effects on scienter in In re Advanta Corp.
Securities Litigation.54 In this securities fraud class action, 55 the Third

9(b). See i& at 533-34.
50 See i& at 537-38.

51 The Supreme Court in Ernst defined "scienter" as an "[i]ntent to
deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
The Second Circuit also added "knowing misconduct" to this definition of scienter.
See Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
52 See Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38.
5-1 Id. at 538 (quoting Shields v. City Trust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128
(2d Cir.
1994)). In affirming the district court's dismissal of the action on other grounds, the
Second Circuit held that the plaintiff, buyer, adequately pleaded scienter. See id. at
538. The "motive and opportunity" test was met by alleging that the broker-dealers
had motive to maintain possession of the treasury bill's proceeds to use the funds
and the opportunity to do so because the proceeds were in the defendants' control.
See id. In its holding, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it has been lenient in
allowing the scienter requirement to be met "based on fairly tenuous inferences." Id,
Although the Second Circuit noted that general allegations of scienter have not been
adequate, the court refused to create an impossible pleading standard regarding
scienter. See id
180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
55 In Advanta, former shareholders of Advanta Corporation
(Advanta), a credit
card issuer, alleged that defendants (Advanta and several of its present and former
officers) made misrepresentations and material omissions regarding Advanta's
earnings potential and stock value in violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See id, at
528-29. Plaintiffs alleged that Advanta's officers failed to disclose credit cards issued
with lower introductory interest rates and longer introductory periods than industry
standards. See id, at 528. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants did not disclose
this practice despite being aware of its risks and after inevitable losses were made
clear. See id Defendants also allegedly misrepresented Advanta's future revenues in
an overly optimistic light. See id. at 528-29. In addition, certain officers were alleged
to have engaged in insider trading. See id. at 529.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
defendant's motion to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(6). See id The district
court found that the allegations did not adequately plead scienter under Rule 9(b)
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Circuit evaluated the PSLRA's plain meaning and legislative history
before drawing relatively the same conclusion about the scienter
requirement as the Fifth and Second ircuits.- That is, a plaintiff
may allege facts that show either "motive and opportunity" or strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness 5 7 to
satisfy the scienter requirement under the PSLRA.
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, in In re Comshare, Inc.
Securities Litigation,59 engaged in a more traditional statutory analysis
of the PSLRA, finding that the plain meaning of the statute contains
a sufficiently clear definition of scienter. 60 Although the Sixth Circuit,
like the Third Circuit, found that the PSLRA's legislative history is
ambiguous and should be afforded little weight, 6' the courts differ in

and the PSLRA. See id.
See id. at 530-35.
57 The Third Circuit defined "recklessness" based upon Sundstrand Corp. v.
Sun
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977). A reckless statement is one
"involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious
that the actor must have been aware of it." Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535 (quoting
Sundstrand,553 F.2d at 1045).
See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35.
59 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
Comsharewas a consolidation of several security
fraud suits alleging that defendants, Comshare, Inc., a Michigan corporation
specializing in computer software, and its controlling persons under § 20(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, defrauded plaintiffs, shareholders of
Comshare, in violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 546-47.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants defrauded them by knowingly or recklessly
disregarding acknowledged accounting errors of premature revenue recognition for
conditional sales and by publicly misrepresenting Comshare's revenue, inducing
See id at 547.
plaintiffs to buy Comshare's stock at artificially high prices.
Particularly, plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to follow Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) as well as their own accounting standards. See id. at
546. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants had "motive and opportunity" to commit
fraud in that higher stock prices resulted in greater compensation to defendants, and
defendants profited by selling shares of Comshare at the inflated stock prices. See id,
at 553.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted
defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See id. at
547. The district court dismissed the action in a Memorandum Opinion and Order
without holding a hearing. See id. In its opinion, the district court held that a
plaintiff must allege facts that give rise to a "strong inference of knowing
misrepresentation or intent" to withstand a motion to dismiss in a securities fraud
context. Id. at 552.
60 See id at 547-53. In accordance with the adopted maxim that legislative
history
of a statute is only examined after its text, and finding no ambiguity in the text of the
PSLRA, the Sixth Circuit never examined the legislative history of the statute. See id.
at 551.
the legislative
61 See id. at 552 n.10 (citations omitted) (stating that "[w]here
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their conclusions based on the PSLRA's plain meaning. Thus, the
Sixth Circuit did not hold that the PSLRA codifies the Second
Circuit's scienter standard, finding that "motive and opportunity" no
A "strong inference" of
longer suffice to plead scienter.
6
"
recklessness, ' however, is still sufficient to constitute scienter under
the PSLRA. 64
Deviating significantly from any prior circuit court decision, the
Ninth Circuit rendered its interpretation of the PSLRA in In re Silicon
65 In this securities fraud class action,'
GraphicsInc. Securities Litigation.
the Ninth Circuit, like the Third Circuit, examined the text and
legislative history of the statute, in addition to prior judicial
Compared to the Third Circuit, the
interpretations of scienter.
Ninth Circuit placed more weight on its interpretation of the
legislative history of the PSLRA. 8 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that "simple" recklessness' was insufficient to plead
scienter 7 0
history of a statute is contradictory and unenlightening, courts should hesitate to rely
on it and instead should look to the statute itself").
62 See i& at 552-53; Advanta, 180 F.3d at
533-35.
0 Consistent with the other circuit courts, the Sixth Circuit defined recklessness
based upon Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.
1977). The Sixth Circuit denoted recklessness to be "highly unreasonable conduct
which is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care. While the
danger need not be known, it must at least be so obvious that any reasonable man
would have known of it." Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550 (quotation and citation omitted).
See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 552-53.
183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
Silicon Graphics was a consolidation of a securities fraud class action, a
shareholder's derivative suit, and two other securities claims. See id at 982. The class
action suit is relevant to this comment. In this securities fraud class action suit,
plaintiffs, shareholders of Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Silicon), a manufacturer of desktop
graphic workstations and software, alleged that defendants, Silicon and six of its
officers, made misrepresentations to raise the value of Silicon's stock while engaging
in insider trading in violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See id at 979-80.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants misrepresented Silicon's condition
despite manufacturing and sales problems and instituted a stock repurchase plan to
raise the price of Silicon stock while profiting through insider trading. See id at 98182.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
dismissed the securities fraud class action without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6).
See id at 983. The district court held that the allegations did not satisfy the scienter
requirement under the PSLRA. See id Furthermore, the district court granted
summary judgment to four Silicon officers on the misrepresentation claims. See id.
67 See id. at 974-79; see also Advanta, 180 F.3d at
530-35.
See Silicon Graphics,183 F.3d at 979.
69 In Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir.
1990), the Ninth
Circuit adopted the standard of recklessness articulated by the Seventh Circuit in
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1997) and
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In Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,7 the Eleventh Circuit surveyed
the accumulating circuit court interpretations of the PSLRA.72 The
Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had previously interpreted
the PSLRA, with all but the Ninth Circuit finding "simple"
Following the apparent
recklessness sufficient to plead scienter.
trend of the circuit courts, the Eleventh Circuit did not wholly codify
the Second Circuit's scienter standard, but determined that "severe
recklessness" created a sufficient basis for scienter 4
The most recent circuit court analysis of the PSLRA's effect on
scienter is the opinion of the First Circuit in Greebel v. FTP Software,
Inc. 75

The First Circuit analyzed both the plain meaning and

legislative history of the PSLRA before reaching the same conclusion

quoted by the other circuit courts in this Comment. That is, recklessness is an
.extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569
(quoting Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045). In Silicon Graphics, the Ninth Circuit raises
the form of recklessness that meets scienter under the PSLRA to a higher form,
termed "deliberate recklessness." See Silicon Graphics,183 F.3d at 979.
70 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
71 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
7
In Bryant, plaintiffs, shareholders of Apple South, Inc. (Avado), an owner and
operator of chain restaurants, brought a securities fraud class action suit against
defendants (Avado and several of its officers). See id. at 1273. Plaintiffs alleged that
defendants made misrepresentations and material omissions regarding Avado's
expansion strategy to inflate the value of the company's stock, thereby infringing
upon § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. See id. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendants
concealed management problems that accompanied Avado's aggressive expansion
into new markets, while misrepresenting the expansion policy's impact on profit
margin. See id. at 1273-74.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia denied
defendant's motion to dismiss in part because of the novel question of scienter
under the PSLRA. See id. at 1273. In dismissing the defendant's motion to dismiss,
the district court certified its order for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). See id.
73 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (defining
"simple" recklessness).
74 See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283. The Eleventh Circuit refers to its
prior form of
recklessness in securities fraud actions as "severe" recklessness. See id. at 1282. The
Eleventh Circuit, in McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., defined "severe recklessness"
as an "extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and that present a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it." McDonald, 863 F.2d 809, 814
(11th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). Although the Eleventh Circuit's language of
"severe" recklessness on its face seems to resemble the Ninth Circuit's "deliberate"
recklessness standard, its definition follows the Seventh Circuit's definition of
recklessness employed by the other circuit courts and referred to in the Ninth Circuit
as "simple" recklessness.
75 194 F.3d 185 (lst Cir. 1999).
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as the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. 76 Thus, the First Circuit found
recklessness to be a sufficient basis for scienter. 77 Although the Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits reached their conclusions based on the text of
the PSLRA alone, the First Circuit found neither the text nor the
legislative history to be unambiguous. 8
The court utilized the
inherent flexibility in the traditional method of analyzing the text of
a statute, supplementing the plain meaning analysis with legislative
history. 79
76

In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs, investors in FTP Software, Inc.

(FTP), a developer, marketer, and supporter of internet and intranet personal
computers and network software, alleged that defendants (FTP and several of its
directors and officers), inflated FTP's stock price through misrepresentations and
omissions in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See Greebel 194
F.3d at 189. The complaint specified that between July 14, 1995 and January 3, 1996,
business threats consisting of diminishing demand, competing systems, and a failure
to keep up with technological advancements occurred. See id. Plaintiffs further
alleged that FTP did not disclose these threats or several questionable sales practices.
See id. The questionable sales practices included "warehouse shipments," which
consisted of fictitious sales in which the product was stored in warehouses and
eventually returned to FTP, excessive sales discounts (up to 90%), and compressing
sales and orders into the end of a fiscal quarter to give the appearance of better
disclosed results for that quarter. See id Plaintiffs further alleged that FTP engaged
in an undisclosed practice of "whiting out" right of return notations on order forms
of distributors to improperly recognize conditional receipts as revenue. See id.
In addition to these undisclosed practices, plaintiff asserted that defendants
made material misrepresentations. See id. Through statements made by FTP's
President and Chief Executive Officer, David Zirkle, plaintiffs claimed that FTP
conveyed an overly optimistic impression regarding its current and future sales,
compounded by a failure to disclose the cancellation of a $10 million product
purchase by the French Post Office in lieu of Windows '95. See id. Among other
alleged material omissions, Zirkle also allegedly failed to disclose long-term costs
associated with FTP's reorganization. See id at 189-90. In the midst of the false
statements, plaintiffs also claimed that insiders sold over $23 million in stock during
the period specified. See id. at 190.
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted
summaryjudgment in favor of the defendants in regard to the "white-out" claim. See
id. at 188. The district court also granted defendants' motion to dismiss with
prejudice in regard to the remaining allegations of securities fraud.
See id.
Nevertheless, the court found that the complaint did not sufficiently allege scienter
under Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements under the PSLRA. See id at 191.
77 The First Circuit defined "recklessness" using the Seventh Circuit
definition.
See id. at 198. The First Circuit further specified that recklessness is closer to intent
than negligence. See id. at 199.
78 See id at
192.
79 See id. The court stated
that
[t]he words of the statute are the first guide to any interpretation of
the meaning of the statute. The usual maxim is that courts do not go
beyond the text of the statute if the meaning is plain. But that maxim
has inherent flexibility. Even seemingly straightforward text should be
informed by the purpose and context of the statute.... If the meaning
is not plain from the words of the statute, then resort to legislative
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II. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE PSLRA

Under traditional methods of statutory interpretation, the text
of a statute is the starting point in deciphering the meaning of a
statute. 0 Accordingly, the text of the PSLRA is a primary source to
which the courts turned in determining Congress's intended effect
on scienter. Although all of the circuit courts examined the text of
the PSLRA, they differed in their interpretations of the language.
A. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit, in Advanta Corp., set out the textual analysis
of the PSLRA that other courts utilized. While the court indicated
that the plain meaning is the usual starting point of statutory
interpretation, the panel dismissed the PSLRA's legislative history as
"contradictory and inconclusive." "' The court began by noting that
security fraud claims under the PSLRA must meet both the pleading
requirements of the PSLRA and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 The court next noted that while Rule 9(b) allows
any state of mind to be averred generally, the PSLRA requires
history is required.
Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit first commented on the
ambiguities present in the text and legislative history of the PSLRA before returning
to the statute's text to resolve those ambiguities. See id.
In addition to finding inherent flexibility in statutory interpretation, the First
Circuit summarized the stances of the plaintiff, defendant, and SEC in determining
the PSLRA's effects on scienter in Greebel, as well as the previous circuit court cases
involving the PSLRA. See id. at 192 n.6. The First Circuit noted that
Defendants urge that both procedural and substantive standards have
been strengthened; that the PSLRA has thus overruled this circuit's
prior law; that allegations that defendants had motive and opportunity
to commit fraud have been eliminated as grounds to show scienter; and
that allegations of simple recklessness do not satisfy the scienter
requirement. Plaintiffs say the PSLRA merely codifies this circuit's
already rigorous pleading requirements, and that it codifies the
previous Second Circuit scienter standards, which, inter alia, permitted
a showing of fraud to be made by evidence of motive and opportunity.
The SEC, as amicus, has articulated its interpretation of the scienter
provisions of the PSLRA: that the Act does not alter the principle that
recklessness is sufficient to establish scienter and that the Act adopts
the two methods recognized by the Second Circuit for pleading
scienter.
While the SEC's views are not binding, they warrant
consideration.
Id. (citation omitted).
80 See Dunn, supranote 32, at 238 n.273 (citing ROBERTA. KATZMANN, COURTSAND
CONGREss 48 (1997)).
81 See In reAdvanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 533 (3d Cir. 1999).
See id. at 531; supra note 30 (reproducing text of the PSLRA); supra note 7
(reproducing the text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)).
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scienter to be stated with particularity. 83 Thus, the court concluded
that the statutory language and the Rule 9(b) requirements impose
conflicting obligations. " The Third Circuit resolved this conflict,
stating that the PSLRA supersedes Rule 9(b) as it relates to security
fraud actions.8 5
Turning to the plain meaning of § 78u-4(b) (2) of the PSLRA,
the Third Circuit distinguished between the procedural requirements
of scienter under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, on the one hand, and the
substantive requirements of scienter, on the other." The Third
Circuit noted that to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
satisfy procedural requirements different from the substantive
requirements of scienter, which a plaintiff must prove to succeed in a
securities fraud case.8 7 The Third Circuit found that the PSLRA's
procedural requirement that a "strong inference" of scienter be
alleged compelled the conclusion that Congress intended to establish
a pleading standard as stringent as the Second Circuit's "strong
inference" standard.8
Furthermore, with the exception of the
"particularity" language borrowed from Rule 9(b), the Third Circuit
observed that the language of the PSLRA was almost identical to the
Second Circuit's pleading standard. 89 The court reasoned that,
because the Second Circuit's scienter standard was the most stringent
standard prior to the PSLRA, this interpretation is consistent with
Congress's goal of heightening the pleading requirements and
deterring frivolous security fraud lawsuits."
The court further
proffered that a national scienter standard in securities fraud cases
equivalent to the Second Circuit's standard would heighten the
pleading requirements in many jurisdictions as they existed at the
time the PSLRA was passed. 9'
Therefore, the Third Circuit
concluded that in addition to heightening existing pleading
requirements in jurisdictions that did not uphold the Second
Circuit's standard, the "particularity language" borrowed from Rule
9(b) will strengthen the procedural pleading requirements of
jurisdictions that already followed the Second Circuit's standard

See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531.
84

See id at 531 n.5.

8

See id

86
87
8

qO
W

See id at 534.

See id. at 534-35.
See id at 534.
See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533.

See id.at 534.
See id
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when the PSLRA was passed. 2 Although the Third Circuit held that
the plain meaning of the PSLRA codified the procedural standards of
the Second Circuit, the court also held that the PSLRA did not alter
the substantive requirements of scienter. 5
B. The Sixth Circuit
As the first appellate court to analyze the meaning of the PSLRA,
the Third Circuit's textual interpretation of § 78u4-(b) (2) set the
groundwork for future textual appellate court analysis, such as that of
the Sixth Circuit in ConsumerProduct Safety Commission. Beginning its
analysis by reviewing Congress's use of the PSLRA to overcome the
shortcomings of Rule 9(b) in the securities fraud context, the Sixth
Circuit focused on the plain meaning of the PSLRA before turning to
its legislative history.94 Like the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
repeated the definition of scienter that the Supreme Court espoused
in Ernst, before interpreting the plain meaning of the PSLRA. 95
Claiming to set aside pre-PSLRA law and focusing on the plain
meaning of the PSLRA, the Sixth Circuit noted that the PSLRA does
not define the "required state of mind" anywhere in its text.b Like
the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit observed that the PSLRA on its
face does not alter the substantive law of scienter but does define the
procedural requirements for securities fraud claims.
The Sixth Circuit focused on the "strong inference" and
"required state of mind" language of the PSLRA to support its
conclusion that the PSLRA altered only the procedural requirements
of scienter. 8 To decipher what constitutes scienter, however, the
court examined pre-PSLRA law, departing from the plain text of the
statute.'" Concluding that Congress must have been aware of the
'2 See
93

id.

See id.(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (A) (1999)

(stating that the PSLRA

expressly denotes subsections 21D(b) (1) and (b) (2) as "pleading requirements").
See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) (stating that when interpreting a statute, a court must begin with its plain
language and may only review congressional intent or legislative history when the

lanfuage of the statute is unclear).
See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 549 (citation omitted).
97 See id. at 548-49. As additional support for this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
noted that in other text of the PSLRA, Congress expressly altered the substantive law.
See id. at 550 n.5 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (1999)) ("requiring plaintiffs to show
'actual knowledge' on the part of defendants alleged to have made misleading or
untrue 'forward-looking statements'").
9 See id. at 549.
99See id. at 550-51. The Sixth Circuit, however, only purported to examine the
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legal context that surrounded the definition of scienter since Ernst,
the court held that recklessness remains a sufficient basis for scienter
if pleaded with facts that give rise to a "strong inference."' °
The Sixth Circuit's remaining analysis, however, greatly departs
from that of the Third Circuit. Expressly recognizing the Third
Circuit's interpretation of the Second Circuit's "motive and
opportunity" test,'0 ' the Sixth Circuit found "motive and opportunity"
to be a procedural requirement of scienter. 02 Interestingly, the court
stated that "motive and opportunity" in securities fraud cases has
been used
to support an allegation of scienter, though not liability
3
itself. 10

C. The Ninth Circuit
In Silicon Graphics, after examining the text of the PSLRA, the
Ninth Circuit found ambiguities that the Sixth Circuit had not
found. 4' Deconstructing the language of the PSLRA, the Ninth
Circuit, like the Third and Sixth Circuits, conducted two separate
inquiries: (1) what constitutes the substantive scienter standard, or
"required state of mind"? and (2) what satisfies the procedural
scienter requirements, or a "strong inference" of the "required state
of mind"? 0 5 In commencing its analysis of the text, the Ninth Circuit
expressly referred to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Conshare to
support its assumption that Congress was aware of the substantive
requirements of scienter when enacting the PSLRA. 10 6 Reviewing
Ernst's requirement of intentional conduct and prior Ninth Circuit
law,10 7 the Silicon Graphics court determined that the text of the
text of the PSLRA, finding it to be unambiguous. See id. at 549.
too See id. at 550.

WI See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551 n.8.
'(
See i& at 551.
103
See id. Although the Sixth Circuit analyzed the PSLRA in the same manner as
the Third Circuit, finding that the PSLRA only altered the procedural requirement
of scienter, the two courts differed in their conclusions because of this finding. By
holding "motive and opportunity" to be a procedural requirement of scienter, the
Sixth Circuit found it to be altered by the PSLRA. On the other hand, by finding
that "motive and opportunity" is a substantive requirement of scienter, the Third

Circuit found it to remain sufficient to support an allegation of scienter. See id.
104

See In reSilicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999).

1o6See id. at 975.
See id, at 975 n.3 (citing Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550).
106

The Ninth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's holding in Ernst, defining
and requiring scienter in security fraud actions, as well as the Ninth Circuit's own
holding in Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978), deeming an
allegation of recklessness sufficient to plead scienter. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at
975-76. In Nelson, however, the Ninth Circuit did not define recklessness, "but [its]
107
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PSLRA heightened the scienter standard by requiring "deliberate
recklessness" to allege securities fraud.'08 The Ninth Circuit noted
that its analysis is similar to that of the Sixth Circuit because both
circuits recognize recklessness under the PSLRA to be "a mental state
apart from negligence and akin to conscious disregard."'q'
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit differs from all other circuits in its
definition of what constitutes the "required state of mind" under the
PSLRA." ° Like the Third and Sixth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit
determined what constitutes the "required state of mind" by
examining the text of the PSLRA.'"
Unlike the Sixth Circuit,
however, the Ninth Circuit found no textual evidence in the PSLRA
to determine satisfactorily whether allegations of "simple
recklessness" or "motive and opportunity" to commit fraud suffice to
raise a "strong inference."
Because the Ninth Circuit found no
indication of what constitutes a "strong inference" in the text of the
PSLRA, the court proceeded to determine the issue through an
analysis of the legislative history of the statute." 3 Although the court
recognized that Congress took the "strong inference" language
directly from the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit dismissed this fact
as nondeterminative after a review of the legislative history of the
statute." 4 The court maintained that Congress adopted the Second
Circuit's language only because it was facially more stringent than the
language of other circuits.

The Ninth Circuit also read the text of the PSLRA in
conjunction with the plain meaning of the statute."' Noting that the
text of the PSLRA did not define the words "fact" and "particularity,"
the court incorporated the ordinary meaning of the words into the
text.17 The court defined a "fact" as an "event or circumstance,""" or
opinion indicates that we viewed it as a form of intentional, not merely negligent
conduct." Id. at 976 (citing Nelson, 576 F.2d at 1337).
108 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
0 Id. at 977 n.7 (quoting Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550).
11 See infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's
analy'sis of the "required state of mind").
See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977; see also Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551; In re
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1999).
112 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977.
113
14

115

See id.
See id. at 979.
See id.

16 See id. at 983 (citation omitted) (stating that when
a statute does not define its
terms, the ordinary meaning of those terms are used).
1 See id. at 983-84.
11
See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 983 (quoting BLACK's LAw DicriONA 'Y591 (7th
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"a truth known by actual experience or observation."" 9 In contrast,
"particularity" requires full details, including minute and
circumstantial facts.'2 ° Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the PSLRA requires a plaintiff
to provide "a list of all relevant
2
circumstances in great detail."' 1
A strong dissent by Judge Browning, agreeing with the Sixth
Circuit, chastised the majority's interpretation of the plain meaning
of the text.'22 Judge Browning noted that the text of the PSLRA does
not abandon the standards of recklessness 2 3 or "motive and
opportunity"' 24 to plead scienter under the "strong inference"
standard. 2 2 The dissent found that the majority's resort to the
legislative history circumvented the plain meaning of the text. 2 6 The
dissent concluded that the lack of specific language codifying the
PSLRA is a sign of breadth, not ambiguity. 27
Further, Judge
Browning reasoned that while Congress did not expressly state that
"motive and opportunity" or recklessness were sufficient to plead
scienter, Congress also did not include language indicating that
conscious behavior was necessary.'28
Additionally, the dissent
criticized the majority for improperly assuming that Congress
intended to raise the scienter standard above mere "motive and
ed. 1999)).
9 Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DIcrIoNARY 473 (rev. ed. 1980)).
20 See id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DIcTIONARY
969 (rev. ed. 1980)).
121 Id at 984.
1
See id.
at 992 n.5 (Browning,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123 The dissent defines
recklessness using the Seventh Circuit's Sundstrand
standard as adopted in Hollinger. See id at 991 (Browning, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent also noted that by adopting this definition of
recklessness, Hollingerintended to bring uniformity to the law of the various circuits.
See id at 995 n.13 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quotation omitted).
The dissent noted that by replacing the definition of
recklessness in Hollingerwith a new standard of "deliberate recklessness," the majority
undermined its intended uniformity in Hollingerand placed itself at odds with other
jurisdictions that have held recklessness to sufficiently plead scienter without altering
its definition. See id. The dissent expressly named the Third and Sixth Circuits'
holdings as being at odds with the Ninth Circuit. See id
14 The dissent defines "motive and
opportunity" through the Second Circuit's
definition, stating that "[m]otive would entail concrete benefits that could be
realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged.
Opportunity would entail the means and likely prospect of achieving concrete
benefits by the means alleged." Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 992 n.6 (Browning, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc.,
25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994)).
1
See id at 992 (Browning,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126, See id
12
See id.
1
See id.at 994 (Browning,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2000]

PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT

1299

opportunity," despite the legislature's failure to codify the more
exacting requirements already developed in other circuits.'"
Moreover, Judge Browning noted that the majority's discussion of the
deliberate recklessness standard did not comment on Congress's
failure to adopt conscious misbehavior under the PSLRA.'"
As the dissent articulated, a universal recklessness standard for
pleading scienter would have been inconsistent with other provisions
of the PSLRA.'5s The dissent explained that the PSLRA's "safe harbor
provisions, ' 1s providing that forward-looking statements must be
made with actual knowledge that they were untrue or misleading,
would contradict a universal recklessness standard.13 Similarly, Judge
Browning noted that other sections of the PSLRA require a
"knowing" violation of securities fraud law to impose joint and several
liability, where Congress explicitly excluded "reckless conduct."
Thus, Judge Browning articulated a strong dissent in the face of the
Ninth Circuit's unprecedented textual interpretation of the PSLRA,
aligning himself with the Sixth Circuit.
D. The FirstCircuit
The Ninth Circuit's bold interpretation of the PSLRA's text,
notwithstanding Judge Browning's strong dissent, has not led to
universal agreement from circuits that have subsequently discussed
the relevant provisions of the PSLRA. In Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 5
the First Circuit implicitly accepted Judge Browning's criticism of
See id. (quoting Press v. Chemical Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir.
1999) (upholding a pleading requirement that includes "strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious misbehavior").
130 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 994 (Browning, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
131 See id. at 994-95 (Browning, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-5(c) (1) (B), 77z-2(c) (1) (B) (1999).
M See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 993 (Browning, J., concurring in part and
1

dissenting in part). Judge Browning's dissent closely mirrored the Sixth Circuit's
analysis of the PSLRA in Comshare. The Sixth Circuit also found the text of the
PSLRA to be unambiguous, making any resort to the legislative history of the PSLRA

unnecessary.
134

See id. at 995 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g) (2) (A) (1999)) (providing that joint and several liability is only
applicable when the defendant "knowingly committed a violation of the securities
laws"); see id (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(10)(B) (1999)) (excluding recklessness
from satisfying knowing violations); see also Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d
185, 200 (1st Cir. 1999) (examining the same safe harbor and joint and several
liability provisions of the PSLRA requiring knowingly violations in support of
retaining recklessness as a substantive basis for scienter).
194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
135
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Silicon Graphics and articulated that Congress intended to
differentiate the scienter standard for joint and several liability from
individual liability. 36 The Greebel court stated that "[b]ecause joint
and several liability is more onerous than individual liability, the
exclusion of recklessness as the basis for imposing joint and several
liability constitutes a recognition that some form of recklessness may
suffice for individual liability." 3 7 The court also asserted that the
"safe harbor" provisions of the PSLRA add additional support to its
conclusion that the PSLRA did not alter the preexisting definitions of
scienter. "8 Once again, the First Circuit noted that Congress
expressly required a knowing violation for liability in this section of
the PSLRA.' 39 The court concluded, therefore, that had Congress
intended to eliminate recklessness under the PSLRA as a generally
sufficient means of satisfying scienter, the language explaining an
intent element for liability under joint and several liability and
forward-looking statements would have been unnecessary.140
In general, the First Circuit found neither the text nor the
legislative history to be "indisputably clear" on some issues,4
particularly as to what constitutes a "strong inference" of scienter.,

1

After determining that the only clear agreement in Congress that can
be deciphered from the PSLRA's legislative history is the purpose of
the statute and its wording, 42 the First Circuit focused on the plain
meaning of the text to determine the scienter requirement. 43 The
court stated that, by requiring a plaintiff to allege a strong
"inference" of scienter, Congress clearly intended that indirect and
circumstantial evidence could be used as proof.'44 The court noted,
however, that Congress required a "strong inference" to be alleged to
survive a motion to dismiss, rather than just a reasonable inference as
allowed prior to the PSLRA.145 Thus, through the text of the PSLRA,
M See id. at 200-01.
'37
1'3
119

140
141

Id. at 200.
See id. at 201.
Seeid (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)) (1999)).

See id. at 200-01.

See Greebe4 194 F.3d at 192.

See id at 192, 195 (stating that "[a]t best, there appears to have been an
agreement to disagree on the issue of Second Circuit standards (other than the
12

.strong inference" standard), and perhaps, as is common, to leave such matters for
courts to resolve").
1
See id. at 195 (noting that "[flrom the words of the Act, certain conclusions can

be drawn").
144

143

See id,
See ieL at 196 n.9. The distinction is important because Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b) (6) states that all inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See
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Congress is "effecting policy-based
46 change through adjustments in
rules."0
evidentiary
or
procedural
After acknowledging the "strong inference" requirement of the
PSLRA's text, the First Circuit's analysis strays from that of the Third
Circuit. The First Circuit abandoned the debate of whether the
PSLRA codifies the Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity" test,47
focusing instead on the "strong inference" language of the PSLRA.1
Finding that the First Circuit never applied the "motive and
opportunity" test,' the court declined either to expressly accept or
deny the notion that "motive and opportunity" alone can amount to a
"strong inference" of scienter. 4 9 The court, however, cautioned that
the strength of the inferences raised by the pleading will be taken
into consideration.'0 Thus, the First Circuit, unlike the other
circuits, did not inquire into whether the PSLRA codified the Second

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (6); see also Greebe4 194 F.3d at 195 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
14
Greebe, 194 F.3d at 196 n.9.
147

See id. at 196.

See id. Specifically, prior to the PSLRA, the First Circuit determined whether
allegations have met the scienter requirement on a case-by-case basis, considering
various types of evidence. See id. The First Circuit further instructed that
[t]his court has considered many different types of evidence as relevant
to show scienter. Examples include: insider trading [discussed in
Greebel]; divergence between internal reports and external statements
on the same subject; closeness in time of an allegedly fraudulent
statement or omission and the later disclosure of inconsistent
information; evidence of bribery by a top company official; existence of
an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud by a company and the company's
quick settlement of that suit; disregard of the most current factual
information before making statements; disclosure of accrual basis
information in a way which could only be understood by a
sophisticated person with a high degree of accounting skill; the
personal interest of certain directors in not informing disinterested
directors of impending sale of stock; and the self-interested motivation
of defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs. While a
number of these cases could be thought of as falling into motive and
opportunity patterns, this court continues to prefer a more fact-specific
inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
As noted in Greebel, this case-by-case approach to scienter is similar to the
Supreme Court's approach to materiality in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988).
In Basic, the Supreme Court held that materiality is determined by
examining the total mix of information on a case-by-case basis. See Basic, 485 U.S. at
240. As noted in Greebel, this is also similar to the case-by-case scienter analysis
employed by the First Circuit in Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1209 (1st
Cir. 1996).
149
See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 196-97.
'5
See id at 197.
148
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Circuit standard, but rather focused on whether the pleadings meet
the textual demands of a "strong inference" of scienter.' 5' Although
the First Circuit refused to expressly eliminate the "motive and
opportunity" test, its cautionary language
effectively vacated its use as
52
the sole means of pleading scienter.'
E. The Eleventh Circuit
The First Circuit's conclusion was similar to that of the Eleventh
Circuit. To reach its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit, in Bryant,
examined the plain meaning of the PSLRA following a review of its
prior decisions upholding recklessness as sufficient to satisfy
scienter. 5 Analyzing only the plain meaning of the PSLRA in its
opinion, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit's previous
analysis.'
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the "required state of
mind" is not defined under the PSLRA.' 55 Because Congress was
aware that all circuits since Ernst found recklessness to be sufficient to
plead scienter, and it did not expressly alter the substantive law of
recklessness, the Eleventh Circuit presumed that Congress intended
to codify this well-established law.5 6 The Eleventh Circuit also found
that, had Congress intended to raise the standard for scienter above
recklessness, it would have done so expressly, as it did in the "safe
harbor provisions" of the PSLRA. 57 According to the Eleventh
Circuit, resorting to the legislative history was unnecessary because
the plain text of the PSLRA is unambiguous in that it does not
substantively change the scienter standard.s
In so holding, the
Eleventh Circuit chastised the Ninth Circuit's holding as failing to
adhere to the text of the
PSLRA and not worth the additional
5 9
uncertainty it introduces.
151 See

id at 196-97.

152

See id

15

See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing

McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989)) (holding

that "severe recklessness" is sufficient to satisfy scienter in securities fraud actions).
15
1'

See id at 1283.
See id at 1284.

I%The Eleventh Circuit stated: "[B]ecause decisions establishing particular legal
doctrine were part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress had acted
and because Congress had left undisturbed the legal principle during subsequent
reenactments, the Court would presume that Congress intended to codify it." Id
(citing Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1991)) (citations
omitted).
157
15
15

See id (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)) (1999)).
See id
See ryant, 187 F.3d at 1284 n.21.
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Turning to the procedural requirement of scienter, and once
again following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit found "motive and opportunity" alone to be insufficient.' 60
First, the court noted that the PSLRA does not expressly mention the
Second Circuit's procedural requirements of scienter. 6' Second, the
court stated that the PSLRA only expressly requires a "strong
inference" of the "required state of mind." 6' Because the "required
state of mind" in the Eleventh Circuit is severe recklessness and
remains such under the PSLRA, a plaintiff must plead with
particularity facts that amount to a "strong inference" of severe
recklessness.'o Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the PSLRA did
not codify the "motive and opportunity" test."
III. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PSLRA

Under traditional methods of statutory interpretation, the
legislative history of a statute is examined when the text of the statute
is deemed ambiguous. 65 Because of the role of legislative history in
statutory interpretation, several circuit courts examined the legislative
history of the PSLRA in interpreting § 78u-4(b) (2).'66
See
See
162 See
163 See

id. at 1285.
id,
id
id. Allegations of "motive and opportunity," although relevant to a showing
of severe recklessness, do not alone satisfy the burden. See id at 1285-86.
1
See id. at 1286. The Eleventh Circuit supported its conclusion by utilizing
references to the text of the PSLRA. See id. The court maintained that a "required
state of mind" refers to a substantive requirement, whereas "motive and opportunity"
are procedural requirements.
See id. The court supported its opinion by
expounding that "motive and opportunity" are specific kinds of evidence, and not
conditions of the mind that would constitute a substantive standard. See id. "Motive
and opportunity," the court articulated, do not constitute a state of mind. See id.
Furthermore, the court asserted that, unlike recklessness, the "motive and
opportunity" test was not uniformly used by all circuit courts to constitute scienter
before the enactment of the PSLRA. See id. The court stated that only the Second
and Ninth Circuits used the "motive and opportunity" test before the enactment of
the PSLRA and applied the test inconsistently. See id Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded, even if "motive and opportunity" were a substantive requirement, it was
not used so universally as to be codified "sub silentio" within the "required state of
mind" as was recklessness. See id. The court further added that this analysis is also
consistent with the purpose of the PSLRA-to curb frivolous litigation-because the
"motive and opportunity" test alone sets a low bar for securities fraud cases. See id.
16 See Dunn, supra note 32, at 238 n.274 (citing ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
COURTS AND
160
161

CONGRFSS 48 (1997)).

16 Specifically, the First and Third Circuits examined
the legislative history of the
PSLRA in their analyses. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir.
1999); In reAdvanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531-33 (3d Cir. 1999). Unlike
the First and Third Circuits, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits did not interpret the
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In Advanta, the Third Circuit was the first federal appellate court
to discuss the PSLRA's legislative history, although the court
ultimately found the PSLRA to be inconclusive on the scienter issues
at hand. 1 7 In its analysis, the Third Circuit briefly discussed the
separate bills proposed and passed in the House of Representatives
and the Senate, as well as the Conference Committee report that
reconciled the respective versions of the PSLRA.M After analysis of
the bills proposed in all three contexts, the Third Circuit
distinguished between the procedural and substantive requirements
of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims with regard to scienter."6
The Third Circuit noted that the bill originally proposed in the
House, House Bill 10,170 would have changed both the procedural
and substantive requirements of securities fraud claims.' 7' The court
observed that House Bill 10 required, as a matter of procedure,
plaintiffs to plead "specific facts" showing that the defendant acted
with the "requisite scienter."

72

The court determined that House Bill

10, as a matter of substance, stated that recklessness was insufficient
to satisfy scienter in securities fraud claims.173 The court noted,
however, that House Bill 10 was revised before passage to allow
recklessness to satisfy the scienter requirement. 74 The Third Circuit
also discussed the Senate's version of the PSLRA. 75 The court first
noted that the Senate Bill 240, demanded that plaintiffs plead
-specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant at

legislative history of the PSLRA. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284-87; In re Comshare, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999). In fact, after noting several of the
debates in the House and Senate that the district court discussed in its holding, the
Sixth Circuit chastised the lower court for erroneously relying upon legislative history
and disregarding the text of the PSLRA. See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.
167 See Advanta,
180 F.3d at 533.
168 See id at 531-32 (citing H.R. 10,
104th Cong. § 204 (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th
Cong. § 4 (1995); S. 240, 104th Cong. § 104 (1995); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at
41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740).
'W See id.
170
171

17
173
174

H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995).
See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531.

See id.
See id (citing H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995)).

See id The House's revision, reinstating recklessness as a basis for scienter,
was

probably influenced by testimony in opposition to the elimination of recklessness by
Arthur Levine, then-Chairman of the SEC. See Dunn, supra note 32, at 208. Mr.
Levine's
testimony was presented
to
the House Subcommittee
on
Telecommunications and Finance, although recklessness was not reinstated until the

House Committee on Commerce's revisions. See id.
See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531-32.
175
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Quoting the report from

the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to
the full Senate on Senate Bill 240, the court next noted that the
Committee based the pleading requirement for scienter on the
Second Circuit's pleading standard. '7 The court highlighted,
however, that a proposed amendment to preserve the Second
Circuit's "motive and opportunity" or recklessness standard had
ultimately been excluded from the PSLRA.' 8 Finally, the court
176
177

Id, at 531 (quoting S. 240, 104th Cong. § 104 (1995)).
See id. at 531-32 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15

(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694). Although the Committee professed
not to adopt a new pleading standard, it further stated that Second Circuit
interpretive case law was not intended to be codified in the PSLRA, but may be
instructive. See id. at 532 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-98, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694).
178 See id, The court observed that the Specter Amendment, proposed
by Senator
Specter, closely paralleled the language of the Second Circuit's pleading standard.
See id. (quoting 141 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Specter)). The court further expounded that the Specter amendment stated:
"For purposes of paragraph (1), a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind may be established either-(A)
by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and
opportunity to commit fraud; or (B) by alleging facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or
recklessness by the defendant."
Id. (quoting 141 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Specter)). In addition, the court recognized that Senator Specter expressly stated
that Second Circuit case law was the basis of his amendment. See id. (citing 141
CONG. REc. S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter)). The court
also identified Senator Specter's further statement that his amendment was based on
a fundamental fairness that "if you take the Second Circuit standard, you ought to
take the entire standard." Id. (quoting 141 CONG. REc. S9200 (daily ed. June 28,
1995) (statement of Sen. Specter)).
The Third Circuit further announced that, although the Specter amendment
was passed within the Senate, the Conference Committee that reconciled the House
and Senate's versions of the PSLRA did not adopt it. See id. The court explained that
the accompanying "Statement of Managers" stated that
"The Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit. The standard also is specifically written
to conform the language to Rule 9(b)'s notion of pleading "with
particularity." Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the
Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with
particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a "strong
inference" of the defendant's fraudulent intent.
Because the
Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading
requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law
interpreting this pleading standard."
Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740).
The Third Circuit articulated that the footnote
accompanying the "Statement of Managers" stated that "'[ftor this reason, the
Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain language
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concluded its review of the legislative history by noting the
interpretation of scienter offered by79President Clinton accompanying
his unsuccessful veto of the PSLRA.
The Advanta court next turned to Congress's subsequent passage
of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(Standards Act).'80 The court stated that, although the Standards Act
does not alter the language of the PSLRA, its Conference Report
states: "'[i] t is the clear understanding of the managers that
Congress did not, in adopting the PSLRA, intend to alter the
standards of liability under the Exchange Act."'' " The court further
suggested that a recent Senate report also reiterated the intent of the
Standards Act, stating that the PSLRA "'establishes a heightened
uniform Federal standard on pleading requirements based upon the
pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.

12

Given the clear disagreement within both the House

and the Senate, however, the Third Circuit noted that the Standards
Act does not resolve the uncertainty of the PSLRA's legislative
history.'83
The court therefore concluded that the PSLRA's
relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness,' an apparent reference to Second
Circuit case law interpreting the pleading requirements for scienter." Id (quoting
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 n.23 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740).
17
See id.at 532-33. Third Circuit explained that President Clinton vetoed the
PSLRA, stating that it imposed excessively high pleading requirements. See id. at 532.
Specifically, the court examined President Clinton's language, which stated:
"I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report
with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable
procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal
Courts. I am prepared to support the high pleading standards of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading
standard of any Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal
clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard
even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that."
Id. at 532-33 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. H1521[5] (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (veto
message of President Clinton)). The court further reported, however, that both
houses of Congress overrode President Clinton's veto with no alterations to the
pleading standard. See id at 533.
180 See id. (discussing PUB. L.
No. 105-353).
181 Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803,
at 17 (1998));
see also S. REP. No. 105-82, at 11 (1998)) ("The managers ... have interpreted the
[PSLRA] as having altered the scienter requirement. In that regard, the managers
again emphasize that the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in this
legislation is that neither the [PSLRA] nor [the Standards Act] in any way alters the
scienter standard in Federal securities fraud suits.").
1
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-82, at 11 (1998)).
183 See id The court discredited any resolution afforded
by the Standards Act by
noting that disagreement as to whether the PSLRA codified the Second Circuit's
pleading standard in both the House and Senate pervaded the Standards Act's
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conflicting statements of legislative intent provided little value,
leaving the court to focus on the plain meaning of the PSLRA to
define scienter.'"
The Third Circuit, however, found that the legislative history of
the PSLRA unambiguously supports the view that the PSLRA only
imposes procedural requirements.'9 In particular, the court stressed
that the "Statement of Managers'" explicitly refers to procedural
requirements when discussing the intent to discourage frivolous
litigation. 7 Further, the court emphasized that the Managers' notes
state that the PSLRA imposes heightened pleading requirements in
response to the varying interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) applied in securities fraud.'88
Not all of the circuit courts accorded as little weight to the
PSLRA's legislative history as did the Third Circuit. In In re Silicon
8 9 the Ninth Circuit found that the
Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation,
plain meaning of the PSLRA is incomplete in defining what
constitutes a "strong inference" of scienter, and thus, the court
analyzed the legislative history of the PSLRA.'" The Ninth Circuit's
discussion of the legislative history, however, materially differed from
that of the Third Circuit. Rather than discussing the original House
and Senate Bills, the Ninth Circuit first looked to the Conference
Committee's report, declaring it to be "the most reliable evidence of
congressional intent" outside the text of the statute. 9 ' Examining the

debates. See id Furthermore, the court averred that "'the interpretation given by
one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little
assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute.'" Id. (quoting Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994)).
184 See id.
Similarly, the First Circuit found the legislative history to be
contradictory and of little value in determining whether the PSLRA codified the
Second Circuit's standard, quoting the Third Circuit's findings of ambiguity and
contradiction. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999)
(quoting Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531).
& See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534.
186 The "Statement of Managers"
accompanied the Conference Committee's
report reconciling H.R. 1058 and S.240. See i. at 532.
187 See i. at 534 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at
32 (1995)) (stating that
"this legislation implements needed procedural protections to discourage frivolous
litiation").
See i& (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995)). In addition, the
court observed that the debates in the House and the Senate, as well as President
Clinton's veto statement, all refer to the PSLRA as altering "pleading requirements."
See i&
189 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.
1999).
19
191

See id. at 977.

Silicon Graphics,183 F.3d at 977.
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Conference Committee's report, the Ninth Circuit initially found an
unambiguous congressional
intent to erect procedural barriers to
92
litigation.
frivolous
prevent
Second, the court discerned a legislative command to raise the
scienter pleading requirement above the Second Circuit's standard.' 93
Similar to the Third Circuit, the Silicon Graphics court found that the
Conference Committee's rejection of the Specter Amendment'"
evidenced a legislative intent to raise the scienter threshold. 9' 5 The
court further found that the congressional override of President
Clinton's veto strongly indicated an intent to require a pleading
standard more stringent than that of the Second Circuit.96 To the
majority in the Ninth Circuit, the legislative history was on some
points dispositive, and on all points persuasive.
A strong dissent in Silicon Graphics found that the text of the
PSLRA was sufficient to determine a codification of the Second
Circuit's standard, but also noted the contradictory legislative
history-the presidential veto and a Conference report that did not
favor a rejection of the Second Circuit's standard. 97 First, the dissent
19
The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion on a joint statement made by the
Managers from the House and Senate stating that "'Congress has been prompted by
significant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits to enact reforms to protect
investors and maintain confidence in our capital markets.'" It.at 977-78 (quoting
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995)). The court also pointed out that the
Managers noted that plaintiffs often filed lawsuits "'against issuers of securities and
others whenever there [was] a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without
regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the
discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action.'" Id at 978
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995)).
193 On this point, the Ninth Circuit focused on the Conference
Committee's
rejection of the Specter Amendment, interpreting the rejection implicitly to reject
the two-pronged test of the Second Circuit. See id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104369, at 41 (1995)). The Ninth Circuit based its reasoning on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that when a
Conference Committee rejects proposed language in a statute, the rejection weighs
against a finding that Congress intended a result it expressly rejected. See Silicon
Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978 (citing Gulf Oi 419 U.S. at 200). Because Congress chose
not to adopt outright the Second Circuit's standard and expressly rejected Second
Circuit case law regarding the "strong inference" standard, the Ninth Circuit found
that the legislative history was unambiguous in that Congress intended to raise the
procedural standard above that of the Second Circuit's standard. See id.
94 See id. (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 n.23 (1995)).
95 See id.
196 See id.at 979.
By overriding President Clinton's veto, "Congress provided
powerful evidence of its intent to elevate the pleading standard to a level beyond that
in the Second Circuit." Id
197 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 993-94 (Browning,
J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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suggested that the Conference Committee rejected the Specter
Amendment because it was an incomplete and imprecise codification
of the Second Circuit's standard, and not because the Committee
wanted to limit what constitutes a "strong inference" of scienter.'9 8
Second, Judge Browning's dissent stated that the Conference
Committee's language, upon which the majority relied, did not show
an intent to impose a more stringent standard than that of the
Second Circuit. l'q Rather, the dissent proffered, the more probable
explanation of Congress's failure to include language relating to
motive, opportunity, or recklessness stems from a desire to codify
only the Second Circuit's procedural requirements2 0 The dissent
198 See id. at 993 (Browning, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Specifically, the dissent noted Senator Dodd's comments on the inaccuracies in the
Specter Amendment as a codification of the Second Circuit's standard. See id, (citing
and quoting 141 CONG. REc. S19067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dodd); see also 141 CONG. REc. S17960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dodd) ("The Senator's amendment adopted the guidance of the [S]econd [C]ircuit,
but the amendment.., completely omits a critical qualification in the case law. The
courts have held that 'where motive is not apparent, a plaintiff may plead scienter by
identifying circumstances' indicating wrongful behavior, but 'the strength of the
circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater' from the number of
cases."); 141 CONG. REC. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
("The Specter Amendment . . . did not really follow the guidance of the [S]econd
[C]ircuit. So that is the reason that amendment was taken out.. . But the suggestion
that the standard and the guidance, rather, was included in the Specter Amendment,
omits that where a motive is not apparent, the strength of circumstantial allegations
must be correspondingly greater. That was omitted."); 141 CONG. REC. S19068 (daily
ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) ("We have left out the guidance. That
does not mean you disregard it."); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740 ("The Conference Committee language is based in part

on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit."); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995),

reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 ("The Committee does not intend to codify
the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard, although courts
may find this body of law instructive.").
See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 993 (Browning, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
2M See id. at 993-94 (Browning, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The
dissent further opined that Congress did not intend to accept or reject the
substantive scienter requirements. See id. Instead, Judge Browning asserted that
Congress deliberately left that to the courts to decide. See id. at 994 (Browning, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
As the dissent expressly recognized, this interpretation is also consistent with the
Third Circuit's analysis. See id. The dissent quoted the Third Circuit's holding that
by not expressly eliminating "motive and opportunity" or recklessness as a basis for
scienter, Congress opted to leave that decision to the courts. See id. (quoting In re
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999)) (stating that "if
Congress had desired to eliminate motive and opportunity or recklessness as a basis
for scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text of the PSLRA. In our view,
the fact that Congress considered inserting language directly addressing this line of
cases, but ultimately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave the matter to
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subsequently concluded that the majority's "deliberate or conscious
recklessness" standard represents a "new, untested" theory that is
"certain to generate additional litigation."2'
The dissent further supported its stance against the majority's
holding by reviewing the position of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) . ° The dissent explained that the SEC is in a
unique position to weigh the benefits of additional disclosure against
the possibility of frivolous litigation resulting from too low a
threshold for civil liability. 3 Based on these goals, the dissent
pointed to the SEC's argument that the PSLRA "did not eliminate
recklessness as a basis for liability generally."M
judicial interpretation"). Furthermore, the dissent complemented its analysis of the
legislative history by reporting statements of Senator Dodd outlining the courts' role
in interpreting scienter under the PSLRA. See id. at 993 n.10 (Browning, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S17960 (daily ed.
Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) ("[I]nstead of trying to take each case that
came under the [S]econd [C]ircuit, we are trying to get to the point where we would
have well-pleaded complaints. We are using the standards in the [S]econd [C)ircuit
in that regard, then letting the courts-as these matters will-test. They can then refer
to specific cases, the [S]econd [C]ircuit, otherwise, to determine if these standards
are based on facts and circumstances in a particular case.").
In addition, the dissent also noted that the majority's standard contradicts the
Senate Report, which stated that "'[t]he Committee does not adopt a new and
untested pleading standard that would generate additional litigation.'" IM at 996
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting S. REP. No. 104-98,
at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694) (Report of Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
201 Id.
22
See id. at 995-96 (Browning,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 995 (Browning,
J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
n.10 (1976)) (deferring to the SEC's interpretation of Rule 14a-9).
Id. The dissent explained that, in the Commission's view, liability for
recklessness is 'essential to the effective functioning of Sections 10(b),' and
'necessary to protect investors and the integrity of the disclosure process.'" Id.
(quotation omitted). The dissent articulated that, like the Third Circuit, the SEC
argues that recklessness is a substantive definition of scienter, and the PSLRA is
intended to alter only procedural requirements of scienter. See id. at 995-96
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically, Judge
Browning identified that the SEC stated, in its Brief of Amicus submitted to the
Ninth Circuit, that
"Construing the [PSLRA] 's pleading standard provision as eliminating
recklessness would convert what was intended to be a procedural
provision into a substantive change in the definition of scienter. It
would, in effect, eliminate recklessness (in private actions) from the
uniformly accepted definition of scienter. Because the substantive law
allows liability for recklessness, it follows that plaintiffs must be allowed
to plead that the defendants acted recklessly. If plaintiffs can state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that defendants
acted recklessly, their complaint is sufficient under the [PSLRA]."
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Finally, Judge Browning's dissent turned to Congress's override
of President Clinton's veto, arguing that the legislature's action
supports a scienter standard above that of the Second Circuit only if
Congress agreed with President Clinton's interpretation of the
PSLRA. 05 Judge Browning supported his position by recounting the
Senate debates discussing the President's veto, during which the
sponsors of the bill explicitly stated that the PSLRA's pleading
standard was "'faithful to the Second Circuit's test' despite the
President's interpretation.' °6
Despite Judge Browning's comprehensive insights into the
legislative history of the PSLRA, the majority in the Ninth Circuit
chose to adhere to a different interpretation of the PSLRA. The
majority's interpretation of the PSLRA, however, did not result from
insights into the legislative history alone. The Ninth Circuit reached
its unique conclusions based on the text of the PSLRA as well.

Id. at 995-96 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotation
omitted); cf In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that "[rietaining recklessness not only is consistent with the PSLRA's expressly
procedural language, but also promotes the policy objectives of discouraging
deliberate ignorance and preventing defendants from escaping liability solely
because of the difficulty of proving conscious intent to commit fraud").
M See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 994 (Browning, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Id. (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dodd)). Judge Browning lists several passages from the Senate debate
overriding the President's veto in support of the dissent's counter-argument to the
evidentiary meaning of the override. See id. at 994 n.12 (BrowningJ, concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting 141 CONG. REc. S19150 (daily ed. Dec. 22,
1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici)) ("The President objected to the pleading
standard. Yet it is the Second Circuit's pleading standard."); see also 141 CONG. REC.
S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (concluding that the
PSLRA "met the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard"); 141 CONG. REC. H15219 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("The President says he supports the
[S]econd [C]ircuit standard for pleading. So do I. That is what is included in this
bill."); 141 CONG. REC. H15218 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moran)
("We know we are going to have the Second Circuit standard applied, and that in
fact when legislation is at variance with legislative history or report language, that it is
the bill itself that prevails.").
In addition, the excerpts of the First Circuit's analysis of President Clinton's veto
complemented Judge Browning's analysis.
After discussing the conflicting
statements in the legislative history of the PSLRA, the First Circuit noted that the
President's interpretation of the PSLRA in his veto statement is ultimately irrelevant.
See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999). Although the
President's veto statement has some interpretive value, the relevant issue is what
Congress intended to codify in the PSLRA, not what the President thought Congress
codified in the PSLRA. See id.
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IV. JUDICIAL CONCLUSIONS: THE STATE OF SCIENTER

It is not surprising that the circuit courts' focus on varying
aspects of the PSLRA's text and legislative history produced varying
conclusions on the scienter standard. In total, three standards
constitute the current state of scienter.
A. The "Motive and Opportunity" or Recklessness Scienter Standard
The "motive and opportunity" or recklessness scienter standard,
codifying the Second Circuit's requirements prior to the PSLRA, is
used by the Third and Second Circuits. In light of the statutory
language and legislative history of the PSLRA, the Third Circuit held
that the PSLRA codifies the Second Circuit's procedural requirement
while leaving undisturbed the substantive law regarding scienter. °7
The court determined that "motive and opportunity" and
recklessness constituted the substantive law of scienter at common
law and, similarly, under the PSLRA.2 0 8

The court qualified this

holding, however, stating that the PSLRA heightened the procedural
requirements regarding the substantive law.2°" Accordingly, "motive
and opportunity" and any other allegation of scienter must be stated
"with particularity" and amount to a "strong inference" of scienter. 1 °
In addition, the Third Circuit found that this interpretation of
the PSLRA was consistent with the congressional goal of discouraging
frivolous litigation by eliminating the sufficiency of general
allegations of scienter, including "motive and opportunity."2 ' Under
this strictly procedural view of the PSLRA, the Third Circuit thus
retained recklessness as a sufficient basis for scienter. The Third
Circuit also posited that this scienter standard achieves the policy
goal of alleviating the difficulty of proving a conscious intent to
perpetrate a fraud that had been present in the cases prior to the
PSLRA.1 2

207
208
209
210
211
212

See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534.
See id&at 534-35.
See id.

See id. at 535.
See id.
See id. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action,

holding that the plaintiffs' conclusory assertions did not meet the PSLRA's
requirements for pleading scienter. See id, at 54142. The court noted that the
PSLRA's safe harbor provisions protect forward-looking statements alleged to be
misleading in the plaintiffs' complaint. See id. "The representations identified by
plaintiffs fall entirely into these categories: accurate reports of past earnings, and
non-actionable expressions of optimism for the future." Id. at 539. Moreover,
allegations "that the defendants acted 'knowingly,' .. . as well as blanket statements
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In essence, the Third Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA is
somewhat untenable. In light of the Sixth Circuit's evidence that
"motive and opportunity" relates to the procedural requirement of
scienter, it is difficult to see how the Third Circuit can justify its
maintenance of the "motive and opportunity" test as a substantive
requirement of scienter.2 '3 Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the
Third Circuit determined that the statutory language of § 78u4(b)(2) closely mirrored the language of the Second Circuit's
scienter standard, given that only the phrase "strong inference" is
used in both. No other language of § 78u-4(b) (2) and the Second
Circuit's standard is the same.
B. The "Recklessness Only" Scienter Standard
The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits adhere to the
"recklessness only" scienter standard, which codifies the recklessness
214

prong of the Second Circuit's scienter standard, but fails to adopt
the "motive and opportunity" prong. The Sixth Circuit, like the
Third Circuit, focused on the plain meaning of the PSLRA in
defining the standard of scienter 1
Unlike the Third Circuit, the
Sixth Circuit did not interpret the legislative history of the PSLRA,
finding its text to be unambiguous. 6 Falling between the standards
created by the Third and Ninth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the PSLRA does not codify the Second Circuit's pleading
standard, as the statute alters the procedural requirements of
scienter, including "motive and opportunity." 2"7 Thus, in the Sixth
Circuit, a plaintiff may allege facts that support a "strong inference"
of recklessness to meet the scienter requirement. 21 Under the Sixth

that defendants must have been aware of the impending losses by virtue of their

positions within the company," failed to meet the pleading requirements of the
PSLRA. Id (citations omitted). The bare inference allegations did not allege fraud
with the particularity required by the PSLRA or support a "strong inference" of
recklessness. See id at 53940. Moreover, the alleged insider trading was not unusual
enough to support scienter under the PSLRA on its own. See id. at 540-41. Three of

Advanta's officers did not sell stock during the period at issue. See id. at 540. Officers
who did sell stock during the period at issue sold only small percentages of their
holdings, and the sales were not large in comparison with prior trading. See id. at

54041.

See supra notes 102 & 103 and accompanying text (illustrating the Sixth
Circuit's position on "motive and opportunity" as a procedural requirement).
214 See supra note 57 (defining "reckless statement").
215 See In reComshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999).
213

216

See id. at 551-52.

217

See id.at 551.

218

See id.

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

1314

[Vol. 30:1279

Circuit's standard, facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of a
"motive and opportunity" to commit fraud no longer suffice to
survive a motion to dismiss; these facts may, however, be 2relevant
to
19
create a "strong inference" of reckless or knowing conduct.
The First Circuit shared some conclusions with the Third
Circuit, finding nothing in the history or text of the PSLRA of
congressional intent to restrict the types of evidence that may show a
"strong inference" of scienter.220 The First Circuit further concluded
that it would be unusual for Congress to determine what evidence
may meet a statutory pleading standard.2 2 '
Noting that the
requirements of PSLRA § 78u-4(b) (1) are similar to the First Circuit's
jurisprudence explaining the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) , the court found that the pleading standards under
the PSLRA were consistent with the court's existing civil pleading
standards. 3 The First Circuit deemed "motive and opportunity,"
alone, insufficient to constitute scienter, although "motive and
opportunity" may be relevant in forming a "strong inference" of
219

See iii

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the

consolidated actions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See id at 554. Although the circuit
court criticized the district court's interpretation of the PSLRA's effect on scienter as
disregarding the PSLRA's plain meaning in "erroneous reliance" on the PSLRA's
legislative history, the circuit court found that the plaintiffs failed adequately to plead
scienter under its interpretation of the PSLRA. See id at 551-52, 554. The court held
that plaintiffs failed to allege facts demonstrating that the accounting errors alleged
were obvious or notice of the accounting errors were consciously disregarded. See id
at 554. The court required more than speculation and conclusory allegations to state
a securities fraud claim. See id.at 553. The court found that the allegation that
defendant failed to follow GAAP, alone, was insufficient to support a securities fraud
claim. See id.Moreover, the court observed that securities fraud is not supported by
allegations that statements made in later reports should have been made in prior
reports or by a showing of a lack of records recording the final character of sales
without allegations of expectations. See id at 553-54. The court held that the facts
alleged by plaintiff demonstrated that defendants had a "motive and opportunity" to
commit securities fraud, but did not rise to the level of a "strong inference" of
recklessness, as required by the PSLRA. See idat 553.
M See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999).
22 See id.(citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998)). It is
common for Congress to leave decisions of this nature to the courts. See id&(citation
omitted).
This circuit has interpreted Rule 9(b) to require specification of the
time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentations[,] . . .the
"factual allegations that would support a reasonable inference that
adverse circumstances existed at the time of the offering, and were
known and deliberately or recklessly disregarded by defendants" . . .
[and] to "set forth the source of the information and the reasons for
the belief."
It.at 193-94 (internal quotations omitted).
22
See i&at 193.
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scienter.2 ' The court further "caution[ed] that 'catch-all allegations
that defendants stood to benefit from wrongdoing and had the
opportunity to implement a fraudulent scheme are [not]
sufficient."' 22 ' The court noted that recklessness may still satisfy
scienter under the PSLRA because neither the statute nor its
legislative history purports to alter the substantive law of scienter.226
Although agreeing with the Sixth Circuit's holding, the Eleventh
Circuit differed in its language regarding recklessness. In particular,
while both the Sixth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit agreed that an
"extreme departure of the standards of ordinary care" satisfies
scienter, the Eleventh Circuit referred to such conduct as "severe
recklessness. 22 1 "Motive and opportunity," however, is no longer
sufficient to satisfy scienter on its own, although it may be relevant
to a showing of severe recklessness. 229
See id. at 197.
Id. (quoting In reAdvanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999)).
rM See Greebe4 194 F.3d at 200. The First Circuit, applying its scienter standard
under the PSLRA to the allegations, found that the allegations were either
insufficiently particularized or failed to raise a "strong inference" of scienter. See id
at 201. Specifically, the court found allegations of "whiting out" conditions to
purchase orders lacked evidence, that the allegations of "warehouse sales" did not
state when these sales occurred or why they harmed the plaintiffs, and that the
allegations of shifting earnings into certain quarters did not rise to the level of a
"strong inference" of scienter. See id. at 201-03. The court also found that the
allegations of revenue recognition from contingent sales falsely inflating revenues
were insufficiently particularized to create a "strong inference." See id at 203. The
court noted that the allegations regarding inflated revenues failed to give an
estimated amount by which revenues were overstated, the time in which the
contingent transactions occurred, and the products involved, or customers or
employees involved in the transactions. See id Moreover, while the court held that
violations of GAAP can constitute evidence of scienter, allegations of improperly
booked revenue did not support a "strong inference" of such. See id. at 203-04.
The court further held that insider trading, if unusual, in suspicious amounts, or
at suspicious times, can support a "strong inference" of scienter. See id at 197-98.
Allegations of insider trading with no reference to its context, however, will not raise
a "strong inference" of scienter under the PSLRA. See id at 198. Because the alleged
insider trading in the case at bar was not unusual, nor at the high point of the
company's stock price, the court concluded that the insider trading did not amount
to a "strong inference" of scienter. See id. at 206-07. Lastly, the court opined that the
optimistic statements by the company's president, and other public disclosures
regarding the company's prospects that were allegedly misleading, were not
actionable under the Securities Act of 1934. See id at 207.
See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999)
(quotation omitted). In Bryant, the Eleventh Circuit uses the terminology "severe
recklessness" to encompass what other courts term "recklessness" because it was the
terminology chosen by the Eleventh Circuit prior to the PSLRA in McDonald v. Alan
Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809 (11th Cir. 1989). See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283
(citation omitted).
M2 In a weak concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Cook expressed his view
24
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The "recklessness only" standard reached by the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits based on the text of the PSLRA is strengthened by
the First Circuit's analysis which upholds the "recklessness only"
standard. This standard, in addition to being the most equitable
compromise between the competing policy interests underlying the
PSLRA, is also the soundest statutory interpretation of the PSLRA.
C. The "DeliberateRecklessness" Scienter Standard
In a category of its own, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff
must plead particular facts that establish "strong circumstantial
evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct." 23 0 The
Ninth Circuit based its substantive holding on the statute's text and
its procedural holding on a reconciliation of the statute's
contradictory legislative history. 23' The court maintained that this
standard best served the purpose of the PSLRA, which was, according
to the Ninth Circuit, "to bar those complaints that fail to raise a
strong inference of intent or deliberateness." 23 2 Particular facts that
demonstrate "motive and opportunity" to commit fraud or simple
recklessness may be relevant in demonstrating some reasonable
inference of intent, but are not alone sufficient to show a "strong
inference" of deliberate recklessness. 3 Thus, to the extent that
recklessness demonstrates intentional or conscious wrongdoing, it
may satisfy scienter. 234
that the sufficiency of "motive and opportunity" to support scienter need not be
addressed because the court's decision establishing recklessness as a sufficient basis
for scienter disposes of the issue on appeal. See i& at 1287 (Cook, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
See id. The Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether the allegations met the
scienter standard under the PSLRA. Unlike the other circuit courts that decided the
issue, the Eleventh Circuit did not rule de novo on a district court's dismissal.
Instead, the circuit court ruled on a certified interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). Thus, the court remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion. See id.
2M In reSilicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d
970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
231 See id. at 974-79.
2 Id. at 975.

See i&.
at 974.
See id. at 977. In affirming the district court's dismissal of the securities fraud
class action, the court discussed which of the pleaded allegations, if any, met the
scienter requirement under the PSLRA. See id Requiring the allegations to contain
great detail, the court found that the allegations that internal reports put officers on
notice of material production and sales problems, which contradicted the company's
positive public reports, were not plead with enough particularity under the PSLRA.
See id. at 985. Specifically, the court observed that the allegations did not include the
contents of the internal reports, the source of plaintiff's information, how plaintiff
learned of the reports, who drafted them, or which officers were in possession of
2

2000]

PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM A CT

1317

A strong dissent in the Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the
holdings of the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits, finding that the
PSLRA allows a plaintiff to satisfactorily plead scienter by alleging
particular facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of a "strong
inference" of conscious misbehavior, recklessness, or a "motive and
opportunity" to commit fraud.2

35

The dissent found that the

majority's holding was a "formulation not found in the text of the
statute, in the legislative history, or in any case heretofore litigated,
and rejected by the responsible administrative agency.,,236
Commentators in the field of securities law should not be
startled to find that the Ninth Circuit is alone in its interpretation of
the PSLRA. 237

By creating a pleading standard of "deliberate"

them. See id. at 984-85. The court also required insider trading to be unusual or
suspicious (substantially different from prior trading practices and designed to
maximize personal benefit from inside information) for the sales to constitute
circumstantial evidence of scienter. See id. at 986. Consistent with its demanding
pleading requirement, the court ruled that officers' sales of fewer than 7.7% of their
total holdings, an Officer's sales of 43.6% of his shares in the company, and an
Officer's sales of 75.3% of his shares in the company, did not amount to a "strong
inference" of deliberate recklessness. See id. at 987. The court found that the sale of
7.7% of the officers' total holdings to be too small to constitute scienter, in addition
to being consistent with prior trading practices. See id. The court deemed the sale of
43.6% of an Officer's shares in Silicon to be too small relative to the total amount of
insider trading to constitute scienter. See id. Lastly, the court concluded that the sale
of 75.3% of an Officer's shares in Silicon did not constitute scienter because of prior
restrictions on that Officer's sales, his lack of contact with other officers, and his
noninvolvement in the allegedly misleading public statements. See id. at 987-88. As
for the remaining allegations of stock sales following pessimistic internal reports, the
Ninth Circuit found them insufficient to constitute scienter, amounting only to
'motive and opportunity." See id. at 988. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that the
complaint lacked particularity and failed to raise a "strong inference" of deliberate
recklessness. See id, at 984. Furthermore, the court stated that this result is
consistent with the PSLRA's goal of reducing frivolous securities fraud litigation. See
id. at 988.
See id.at 996 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 996 (Browning, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent further posited that the allegations alleged by the
class action plaintiff were sufficient to meet its scienter standard under the PSLRA.
See id. The dissent proffered that scienter was met through the plaintiffs' two factual
bases pleaded with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b) as modified by the
PSLRA: (1) internal corporate reports evidencing that the defendants knew of
difficulties that made their positive public statements misrepresentations; and (2)
large amounts of insider trading during a peak price period in the corporation's
stock. See id. at 998 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although the dissent agreed with the majority that particularity under Rule 9(b) and
the PSLRA required plaintiff to allege "who, what, when, where, and how" with
respect to facts that underlay the plaintiffs claim, the dissent faulted the majority for
requiring pleadings that were too detailed. See i& at 999 n.24 (Browning, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237 While denying a petition for rehearing, the dissenting
opinion noted that the
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recklessness, the Ninth Circuit, in essence, requires plaintiffs to
establish intent without discovery. "Deliberate" recklessness amounts
to nothing less than conscious misbehavior because one may not
"deliberately" act with recklessness.3 In addition to forming a new
and uncertain standard of scienter under the PSLRA, the Ninth
Circuit established a seemingly impossible barrier to private
individuals bringing a securities fraud claim under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. In forming this barrier as a statutory pleading requirement for
scienter, the Ninth Circuit's decision effectively denies private
individuals, claiming securities fraud, the opportunity to go to trial.
In addition, due to material limitations in other federal
securities laws 2 9 and the procedural barriers to derivative lawsuits,24° a

private individual who is a victim of securities fraud has limited
recourse in the Ninth Circuit. By denying a private plaintiff effective
relief from securities fraud, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
PSLRA does not fairly balance the policy issues behind the statute.
Although the PSLRA was designed to prevent abusive securities fraud
litigation, it must also allow for reasonable securities fraud claims-a

Ninth Circuit has been the only circuit court to reject recklessness as a sufficient basis
to meet scienter under the PSLRA. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 195
F.3d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt,J., dissenting).
M
This resembles the reasoning the Supreme Court of South Dakota employed
in
State v. Lyerla, 424 N.W.2d 908 (S.D. 1988), finding intentional recklessness to be a
logical impossibility. Although this decision directly pertained to attempted seconddegree murder, entailing a different context and a different definition of
recklessness than in Silicon, the sentiment is the same. One may not deliberately do
what is inherently unintentional.
M There are several federal securities laws
that address securities fraud in the
form of material omissions and misrepresentations and insider trading. Specifically,
§ 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 addresses securities fraud within
the solicitation of corporate proxies, § 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 addresses short swing trading by corporate insiders (directors, officers, and
owners of over 10% of equities outstanding), and § 10(b) addresses insider trading
and fraud in any context. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1999). Private individuals have
standing under each of these three sections to bring a securities fraud suit. In
addition to the already narrow contexts in which §§ 14(a) and 16(b) apply, these
sections are further limited to securities registered under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. This includes only securities traded on a national exchange
or corporations with over $10 million in gross assets and 500 shareholders. Because
of the material limitations in the application of §§ 14(a) and 16(b), § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 have emerged as the main source of action of a private individual in a
securities fraud claim.
20 See SELIGMAN,
supra note 5 at 591. To bring a derivative suit, a private
individual faces procedural barriers that may include standing requirements, such as
the contemporaneous ownership rule, demand requirements on the board of
directors, and the required posting of a security for cost bond to cover the
defendants' expenses. See id.
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possibility foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's singular emphasis on
preventing abusive litigation.
The comparative leniency of scienter standards outside the
Ninth Circuit has not, however, resulted in a greater number of
successful securities fraud claims in other jurisdictions. Notably, each
circuit court case examined in this Comment has dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims without examining the underlying merits. All but
the Second Circuit dismissed its respective cases, at least in part,
based on a failure to meet the scienter requirement under the
PSLRA. Even the Second Circuit, by upholding the most lenient
standard and finding that the plaintiff met that standard,
nevertheless dismissed the action on other grounds.
In light of the various circuit court opinions, the plain meaning
of the PSLRA, its legislative history, and the competing public policy
regarding securities fraud litigation, it is increasingly evident that the
PSLRA raises the procedural requirement of scienter above that of
"motive and opportunity," while leaving the substantive requirement
of recklessness untouched.
This conclusion is plausible
notwithstanding the ambiguity of the statute's language and
legislative history. The statute neither defines nor elaborates upon
the relevant "required state of mind," despite the text's reference to
the Second Circuit's "strong inference" requirement and the demand
of Rule 9 (b) that facts be alleged with "particularity."
In addition, the legislative history demonstrates marked
disagreement as to the meaning of the PSLRA, with Congress
agreeing only that it alters the procedural requirement of scienter.
Because "motive and opportunity" is best characterized as a
procedural requirement of scienter and recklessness is best
characterized as a substantive standard, only the "motive and
opportunity" test is eliminated by the PSLRA's "strong inference"
requirement. Thus, when read in full, the PSLRA requires a plaintiff
to plead particularized facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of
recklessness. Because conscious misbehavior or intent are more
stringent standards than recklessness, particularized facts that give
rise to a "strong inference" of conscious misbehavior or intent may
also establish scienter under the PSLRA. This interpretation of the
scienter debacle not only accords with the congressional goal of
reducing abusive security fraud litigation, but also affords plaintiffs a
reasonable opportunity to bring legitimate claims.
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CONCLUSION

Currently, the' Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court to raise the
required level of scienter above recklessness. Contrary to the Ninth
Circuit's holding, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that specific claims of recklessness are still
sufficient to satisfy scienter.24' Only the Second, Third, and Fifth
Circuits, however, have held that specific claims of "motive and
opportunity" alone can rise to the level of a "strong inference" of
scienter. Thus, the circuit courts have disagreed on the PSLRA's
intended effects on the scienter requirement, forming three
categories of opinions. One category codifies the Second Circuit's
"motive and opportunity" test or recklessness as sufficient to support
scienter. The second category codifies only recklessness as sufficient
to support scienter, and the third category raises scienter above both
recklessness or "motive and opportunity."
In reaching these varying conclusions, the circuit courts have
differed in their analyses. Some circuit courts have found that the
text of the PSLRA is unambiguous in its meaning, while others have
gone beyond the text to examine the legislative history. Still other
circuit courts have stated their conclusions regarding the PSLRA
without any statutory or legislative review. 242 To date, all circuit
courts besides the Ninth Circuit agree that the PSLRA is intended to
alter only the procedural, not the substantive, requirements of
scienter. Moreover, all of the circuit courts agree that a "strong

It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit considered the issue in dicta. See supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
242 The Circuit Courts examined in this Comment may be summarized as follows:
241

Circuit Court
First
Second

Examined
text & legislative history
nothing

Third

text & legislative history

Fourth
dicta)

(in

Fifth (in dicta)
Sixth
Ninth
Eleventh
Consclous
PSLRA.

text & legislative history
nothing
text only
text & legislative history
text only

Standard
recklessness only*
motive and opportunity"
or recklessness
'motive and opportunity"
or recklessness
n/a
"motive and opportunity"
or recklessness
recklessness only
"deliberate" recklessness only
(severe) recklessness only

misoenavior or intent win always suIlice to establish scieLer under me
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inference" of scienter must be raised.
What constitutes the
procedural requirements of scienter and a "strong inference" of
scienter, however, remains unclear.
Although the circuit courts have disagreed upon what
constitutes the procedural requirement of scienter and a "strong
inference" of scienter, the soundest statutory interpretation of the
PSLRA points to a standard that only recklessness, or a higher state of
mind, is sufficient to form scienter under the PSLRA. The text of the
PSLRA, the usual starting point in statutory analysis, is ambiguous as
to Congress's intended scienter standard. The legislative history of
the PSLRA is equally ambiguous, except in that Congress only
intended to alter the procedural scienter requirements. Because
"motive and opportunity" is best characterized as a procedural
requirement of scienter, only recklessness, a substantive requirement
of scienter, should remain sufficient to form scienter under the
PSLRA.
Scott H. Moss

